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Differentiated Service (DiffServ) networks provide Quality of Service (QoS) 
guarantees by policing traffic into a fixed number of pre-existing classes.  DoS1 
attacks against DiffServ clients will be more targeted and require less attack 
bandwidth than current attacks due to the per-client and per-class bandwidth 
limitations which must be imposed to ensure QoS guarantees.  In this paper, we 
present a technique for defeating a DoS attack on a DiffServ client through 
dynamic modification of packet headers.  This technique allows the DiffServ 
network to distinguish valid traffic from malicious traffic, but does not require 
cryptographic processing on a per-packet basis and does not increase packet 
size.  We also examine the sensitivity of our system to the traffic policer’s token 
bucket size. 
1.  Introduction 
 
Differentiated Service provides QoS without maintaining per-flow state 
information in core routers.  Traffic classification is distributed to the edges of 
the network where volume is lighter.  Ingress (edge) routers police traffic 
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1 In this paper the term Denial of Service (DoS) is used to encompass all forms 
of denial of service attacks, including distributed (DDoS) and reflected 
(RDDoS) attacks. 
entering the network, classifying and conditioning it to conform to a specific 
behavior aggregate based on the Service Level Agreement (SLA) between the 
source and the DiffServ provider.  Each behavior aggregate is identified by a 
single DiffServ code-point, which is stored in the ToS field of the IP header.  
Within the core of the network, packets are forwarded according to the per-hop 
behavior associated with the DiffServ code-point [1].  Core routers do not track 
the state of individual flows.  They are only responsible for forwarding based on 
the marking assigned to each packet when it entered the network. 
DoS attacks attempt to artificially exhaust a service provider’s 
resources, such as bandwidth, memory, or processor cycles.  Legitimate users 
are prevented from receiving service due to the lack of available resources.  
Most DoS attacks rely on the same basic strategy.  The attacker compromises a 
group of non-target hosts, and causes them to send a flood of traffic to the 
target2. The small floods from individual hosts eventually merge into a large 
flood at the target’s upstream router.  This flood traffic consumes the bandwidth 
on the link to the target, causing an overflow of the queue on the link.  The 
source addresses in the packets’ headers are usually altered to prevent discovery 
of the compromised hosts. 
Various methods of countering DoS attacks have been proposed.  
These include Ingress Filtering [3], IP Traceback [5,11], Router Throttling [14], 
and Distributed Filtering [6].  The drawback common to these methods is the 
requirement for third-party routers or hosts to cooperate in order for the 
countermeasure to be effective.  Cooperation issues aside, one would ideally 
wish to counter a DoS flooding attack by stopping it at the source or the 
source’s ISP.  Without knowing the true source of the attack, all packets must 
be treated as valid at the network layer.  However, IP alone does not provide a 
reliable way for the receiver to determine the true source of incoming packets, 
since the source address field can easily be spoofed.  
The Authentication Header (AH) extension to the IP protocol [4] is an 
established means of verifying the source of a traffic flow.  It is possible to 
determine the validity of a packet’s source address for 100% of the packets 
which use the AH.  However, the per-packet cryptographic processing required 
for IP AH does not scale well, and may be too computationally intensive  to 
implement while maintaining QoS guarantees.  Additionally, IP AH requires the 
                                                 
2 In the case of a reflected DoS attack, the compromised hosts send their flood 
traffic to a third party, which (unwittingly) sends a reply to the forged 
source/target of the flood.  This added step is used to further obfuscate the true 
location of the compromised hosts, and in some cases, to multiply the effective 
attack bandwidth. 
insertion of an additional header field3 into each packet.  This can lead to packet 
fragmentation, which negatively affects QoS. 
New types of DoS attacks will accompany implementation of the 
Differentiated Services model.  The separation of traffic into distinct classes and 
policing traffic on a per client basis will make it easier for an attacker to target a 
specific subset of the traffic flowing between nodes.  Since resources for 
individual traffic classes will be limited, it may be easier to exhaust resources 
available to those classes.  Furthermore, bandwidth limits imposed on sources in 
order to maintain QoS guarantees will impose an artificial bottleneck that 
attackers can exploit.  If the DiffServ network reduces the bandwidth available 
to best effort traffic in order to maintain service guarantees to other traffic, it 
may inadvertently facilitate a DoS attack against best effort traffic.  Service 
theft, the unauthorized use of guaranteed services, may also result in a denial of 
service to legitimate users of those services. 
Differentiated Service offers new possibilities for the prevention of 
DoS attacks as well.  Since QoS guarantees are only provided to paying clients, 
the DiffServ provider must maintain a database of clients in order to properly 
meter traffic and provide appropriate QoS.  The provider can use this data at 
ingress routers to quickly downgrade or drop packets marked with non-client 
source addresses.  Of course, an attacker could simply forge the source 
addresses of actual clients, so the router must have another means of filtering 
malicious traffic.  However, this requires the attacker to use addresses of hosts 
that the DiffServ provider knows are valid and can contact to verify the 
authenticity of the traffic being received. 
Based on this observation, we have designed a feedback mechanism 
through which a provider can notify clients when their traffic does not conform 
to the profile specified in the SLA.  We also have developed a marking method 
that the client can use in certain cases to make its packets readily 
distinguishable from traffic with forged headers.  The resulting DoS 
countermeasure  
a) does not require per-packet cryptographic processing,  
b) does not rely on cooperation from third-party hosts or routers, 
c) does not increase the likelihood of packet fragmentation, and 
d) has negligible or no effect on the provider’s ability to guarantee QoS. 
 We have not attempted to devise a solution that will guarantee 
authentication of 100% of incoming packets or a zero loss rate for valid, in-
                                                 
3 The minimum size of the AH header is 16 bytes; the maximum size depends 
on the size of the encrypted packet and the AH options selected 
profile traffic.  We present the conditions under which our marking method will 
guarantee 100% authentication, and those under which it will not.  For the latter 
cases, we have derived a formula for predicting the loss rate of valid traffic.  We 
have implemented our solutions in the ns2 network simulator to confirm the 
correctness of our formula. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details 
the DoS attack scenario that has motivated this work. Our countermeasure for 
this attack is described in Section 3.    The performance analysis and simulation 
results are presented in Section 4.  Section 5 describes several refinements to the 
countermeasure to enhance its robustness and make it suitable for detection of 
service theft.  Finally in Section 6, we offer some concluding remarks.  
2.  Attack Scenario 
 
If an attacker could compromise hosts or routers within the DiffServ domain, it 
could create a DoS for traffic flowing in the domain.  Similarly, an attacker 
could deny service to a client by compromising client systems.  While these 
types of DoS are both possible and effective, solutions to them are beyond the 
scope of this paper.  Our research focuses on a method of attack similar to the 
most common types of attacks employed in the current Internet.  Below, we set 
out the conditions under which this type of attack is possible. 
A bandwidth consumption attack is harder to accomplish if the flood 
traffic must traverse a DiffServ network.  The network will give preferential 
treatment to packets from paying clients.  Packets from unrecognized sources 
will be assigned a default code-point, which equates to best effort service.  
Valid packets will be more likely to reach their destination because of the 
priority they receive over best-effort traffic.  While this will provide more DoS 
protection for the endpoints of flow paths, the overall effect will be a shift in the 
focus of DoS attacks to the point at which the flow enters a DoS domain.  This 
is the logical point to attack the traffic since bandwidth limitations imposed by 
SLA enforcement will make the DiffServ network the narrowest section of the 
path. 
DiffServ domains only provide preferred service to recognized clients.  
At the network layer, incoming packets are classified to receive preferential 
treatment if their source address matches the address associated with an existing 
SLA.  Consequently, an attacker must mark malicious packets with the address 
of a valid DiffServ client to attack the class of traffic associated with that client 
or SLA. 
The DiffServ domain must be able to meter each client’s traffic in 
order to ensure client adherence to SLAs with regard to usage amounts.  It is 
possible to distribute this metering across all ingress routers, or to process and 
store metering information in a central database.  We assume that this metering 
is not distributed or managed in a centralized manner.  Instead, the DiffServ 
domain assigns a specific ingress router as the designated entry point for traffic 
from a given client.  This eliminates overhead associated with intra-domain 
metering communications.  It also allows the DiffServ domain to filter incoming 
traffic based on the router it arrives at.  Therefore, to conduct a successful 
attack, the attacker must not only spoof the address of a valid client, but it must 
ensure that flooding traffic arrives at the ingress router assigned to that client. 
In a wired network, if a client is only one hop away form the ingress 
router, the DiffServ domain will also be able to filter traffic based on the 
incoming link.  In this case, it will be impossible for an attacker to flood 
spoofed traffic using this client’s source address, since we have already stated 
that the client itself cannot be compromised.  It follows that no attack is possible 
unless the client is more than one hop away from its assigned ingress router.  
This does not hold true, however, if the client’s connection to the ingress router 
is a wireless link, since the transmission medium itself is not secure. 
We make the assumption that the bandwidth of the path between the 
client gateway and the ingress router is sizeable enough that attacker will not be 
able to conduct a bandwidth consumption attack against the ingress router or the 
client gateway.  Further, we assume that the attacker is limited to monitoring the 
client’s traffic, and cannot alter, delay, or destroy packets while in transit. 
3.  Countermeasure for DoS Attacks 
 
We propose a technique that will allow the ingress router of the DiffServ 
domain to distinguish valid packets from malicious ones based on signature.  
We define a packet’s signature as a combination of the source address field and 
one or more other fields in the IP header.  Our method relies on the ability of the 
client to alter this signature. We assume that an attacker will be able to observe 
traffic flowing between the client and the DiffServ domain, and that the attacker 
will be able to instruct the flood sources to mimic any changes to packet 
signatures that it observes.  Therefore changing the headers once is insufficient.  
Changes must be made on a periodic basis, and must be done faster than the 
attacker can duplicate them. 
Figure 1 is a time diagram showing the sequence of actions involved in 
our proposed countermeasure.  When the ingress router marks a packet that 
appears to originate from a DiffServ client as out-of profile, it will log the 
source and time (t1) of the drop.  When the rate of out-of-profile marking 
exceeds a pre-set threshold (t2), the router will send a feedback message (A) to 
the client.  Upon receipt (t3), the client will begin altering the signature of its 
packets.  The ingress router will use these alterations to identify valid packets.  
It will drop all packets with an invalid signature.  Details of the individual 
actions taken by the client and DiffServ router are given below 
The router feedback to the client will consist of a router-generated seed 
key for an algorithm that generates a sequence of signatures.  The client and 
router will be able to independently calculate what the correct signature should 
be using this algorithm and the seed-key.  The algorithm can be well known as 
long as the seed key being used remains secret.  The seed key will be encrypted 
using a shared secret key and digitally signed.  The seed key is used to generate 
new signatures instead of the shared secret key to avoid compromising the 
secret key through overuse.  The digital signature provides authentication for 































Figure 1.  Time Sequence for DoS Attack and Countermeasure 
these messages.  Payload encryption is required since the attacker can monitor 
traffic flowing between the client and the DiffServ domain.  Since the algorithm 
for generating signature values is not secret, access to unencrypted seed keys, 
would allow the attacker to change the signature of the attack packets as rapidly 
as the sender could, thus circumventing the countermeasure. 
Upon receipt of a feedback message, the client will authenticate it, 
decrypt the payload, and use the seed key to calculate the sequence of signature 
values that it will use.  The client will immediately begin using the values in the 
designated fields of the IP headers of its packets.  It will switch to the next 
signature (Si) in the sequence at regular intervals denoted by W.  The attacker 
will not know what each new signature is until it receives the information from 
the monitor installed along the path of the client traffic (B).  When it knows the 
new signature, it can direct the flood sources to change the signatures they are 
using (C).  The time between when the ingress router receives the first valid 
packet with a new signature and when it receives the first attack packet with the 
same signature, denoted by d, is the window in which 100% authentication is 
possible.  The importance of the relative values of d and W are discussed in 
section 4. 
The seed key is also used to create the same sequence of signature 
values at the router.  After sending a feedback message, the router will treat all 
packets as valid until it receives the first packet with the first altered signature.  
All successive packets with an incorrect signature are dropped, except the first 
packet received with the second signature.  When the first packet with the 
second signature is received, the router will drop all successive packets that do 
not match the second signature, including those marked with the first signature.  
This prevents an attacker from using old signatures to circumvent the DoS 
countermeasures. 
4.  Performance Evaluation 
 
In this section, we try to evaluate the effectiveness of the feedback mechanism 
in mitigating the DoS attack. The main performance metric of interest is the 
client’s packet out-of-profile rate, i.e., the percentage of the DiffServ client’s 
packets being marked out of profile at the ingress router. We consider a DoS 
countermeasure more effective than another if it achieves a smaller rate of out-
of-profile packets for the client given the same network setup and attack 
scenario. As a secondary interest we also examine the fairness aspect of the 
feedback mechanism. Obviously it is desirable that a DoS countermeasure be 
able to distribute out-of-profile packets evenly among all current connections of 
the DiffServ client.  Finally, we are also interested in how the feedback 
mechanism may aid in the detection of DoS attacks and the more elusive service 
thefts. We will treat this important topic separately in Section 5.2. 
 Our performance evaluation consists of two steps. In the first step, we 
create an analytical model of the feedback mechanism with a set of simplifying 
assumptions and then derive from this model a closed form solution for the 
DiffServ client’s packet out-of-profile rate. In the second step, we verify the 
analytical results via simulation experiments. 
4.1.  Derivation of Client’s Packet Out-Of-Profile Rate 
Denote the percentage of the client’s packets being marked out of profile at the 
ingress router by p. In order to derive p, we make the following additional 
assumptions: 
1. All packets have the same size.  
2. The client’s traffic arrives at the ingress router at a constant rate of r 
packets per second, which is less than or equal to CIR, the client’s allocated 
committed information rate in packets per second. 
3. The attack traffic arrives at the ingress router at a constant rate of A packets 
per second such that  
             CIRAr ³+                              (1) 
This means the percentage of valid traffic received by the ingress router is 
equal to 
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4. The client traffic switches to a new signature every W seconds. The attack 
traffic tries to make the same signature change, but the change always 
happens d seconds later from the ingress router’s perspective. In other 
words, there is a fixed lag of d between the arrival time at the ingress of the 
first valid packet with a new signature and the arrival time of the first attack 
packet with the same signature. 
5. The ingress router’s traffic metering process for the client is fair so that if 
the traffic being metered is made of several flows, each flow will be 
ensured of a share of in-profile packets that is proportion to the flow’s 
packet arrival rate. 
 
Consider the time window for an arbitrary signature used by the client’s traffic. 
There are two cases:  
· Case 1: .dW £  From assumption 4, during the entire time period, every 
attack packet carries an expired signature when inspected by the ingress 
router. Such packets will be dropped before being counted against the 
client’s committed rate in the metering process. From assumption 2, the 
rate of the valid traffic alone does not exceed the committed rate. Thus, we 
have .0=p  
· Case 2: .dW >  From assumption 4, during an initial time period equal to 
d, the ingress router will be able to drop all attack packets.  However, for 
the remaining time of dW - , the ingress will not be able to distinguish 
valid traffic from attack traffic because they have the same signature. In 
that case, some of the client’s packets will be marked out-of-profile. From 
assumption 5 and Equation (2), the percentage of client packets marked as 
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Dividing (5) by the total number of packets sent by the client during the 
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It can be shown via a similar derivation that 0p , the packet out-of-profile 
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Using equation (7), we rewrite equation (5) as: 
0)1( pW
d
p ´-= .                                           (8) 
Equation (8) clearly indicates that the reduction in the packet out-of-profile 
rate due to the feedback mechanism is inversely proportional to W, the 
period between signature changes by the client. 
Combining both cases, we have proved the following theorem. 
Theorem 1.  If assumptions 1-5 hold, then after the client initiates the DoS 
countermeasure as a result of the feedback mechanism, the client’s packet out-
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4.2.  Fairness 
The DiffServ client’s traffic is typically an aggregation of packets from a 
number of application flows.  Theorem 1 gives the packet out-of-profile rate for 
the aggregate. One can use it to predict the total number of client packets 
marked out of profile in any given time period.  However, Theorem 1 does not 
tell how these out-of-profile packets are distributed among the flows.  In other 
words, we need to examine further how fairly each flow is treated by the DoS 
countermeasure.  It is important that the out-of-profile packets be spread out 
evenly.  The application associated with an individual flow, such as a TCP 
connection or a Voice-over-IP (VoIP) receiver, is usually designed to resist a 
limited amount of QoS degradation to the flow’s packets.  If the QoS 
degradation exceeds that limit, as in the case where the flow has a 
disproportionately large number of packets marked out-of-profile, the 
application may not be able to function properly.  
Denote the set of flows carried by the client traffic by S.  Let )( fp  be 
the packet out-of-profile rate of flow f.  We measure the fairness of a DoS 
countermeasure by the following metric, called fairness index: 
)}({min)}({max gpfpF
SgSf ÎÎ
-= .                           (10) 
Clearly the value of F has a range between 0 and 1. The closer F is to 0, the 
smaller the maximum difference between any two flows’ packet out-of-profile 
rates is. Therefore, it is important for a DoS countermeasure to minimize F. 
Next we evaluate the fairness property of the DoS countermeasure 
based on our feedback mechanism.  It is possible to develop an analytical 
solution for F by making additional assumptions on each flow’s packet arrival 
process.  However for brevity, we will skip such a formal treatment. Instead, we 
try to qualify the fairness performance of the DoS countermeasure with the 
following observation.  
Recall the steps for deriving the client’s out-of-profile rate.  If W is a 
constant and if W is larger than d, the DoS countermeasure creates periodic DoS 
effective time intervals as illustrated in Figure 2 blow. 
During these time intervals, the countermeasure is ineffective and the 
DoS attack causes high packet out-of-profile rates for the client.  Now suppose 
that one of the client’s flows, e.g., created by a NetMeeting application, 
generates packets periodically.  It is possible that the flow started during a DoS 
effective interval and its packet generation period is similar to W.  In such a 
case, the flow’s packets always arrive at the ingress during DoS effective 
periods, resulting a disproportionately high out-of-profile rate for the flow.  
Therefore, the DoS countermeasure may not treat the flows fairly.  One 
fix is to have the client randomize the value of W.  We intend to evaluate the 
performance of this fix and other solutions to enhance the fairness of the 
countermeasure in our follow-on work 
4.3.  Experimental Results 
In this subsection we describe the simulator, the extensions that were made to 
the simulator to implement our countermeasure, the experimental network 
topology used during simulation, and the simulation results. 
4.3.1.  Simulator and Extensions 
 The experiments were conducted using version 2.1b8a of ns2, a 
discrete event simulator targeted at networking research [6].  The simulator is 
object-oriented, written in C++, and uses Otcl as a command and configuration 
interface [2].  The simulator includes a DiffServ module with implementations 
of distinct core and edge routers, several marking policies, and built-in tracing 
for DiffServ queues.   
The DoS countermeasure was implemented through creation of new 
objects inherited from existing ns2 objects.  Significant changes include 
modification of the existing policing algorithm employed by DiffServ edge 
routers, implementation of a means of periodically altering the IP ToS field at 
run-time, and creation of a new agent to carry the feedback messages from the 
DiffServ ingress router to the client.  Several Otcl functions were also added to 
provide necessary links between the command interface and the C++ classes. 
After examining the IP header format, we have chosen to use the Type 
of Service (ToS) field in the IP header as the mutable portion of the packet 
signature in our simulation.  The ToS field is unused in the non-DiffServ routers 
between the client and the DiffServ provider, so modifying it at the source will 
not affect packet routing outside of the DiffServ domain.4.  DiffServ ingress 
routers change this field after receipt based on the client’s SLA, so modifying it 
will not affect routing within the DS domain.  In the remainder of this section,, 
signature refers specifically to the combination of IP source address and IP ToS 
field.  However, other fields such as ID or Options could be used in place of or 
in combination with the ToS field to determine packet signature. 
4.3.2.  Topology 
 Figure 3 shows the ns2 topology that was used to conduct experiments.  
The times t , tA , tC , and tF represent the sum of all delays incurred by a packet 
transiting the respective link, including processing, transmission, and 
propagation delays.  We observe that the difference in arrival times at the 
ingress router of the first valid and invalid packets with the same signature, 
which we have previously named d, can be written  
( ) ttttd FCA -++= .                            (11) 
For all simulations the client and flood sources were set to transmit fixed sized 
packets at a constant bit rate.  A small degree of random variation in packet 
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Figure 2.  Periodic DoS Effective Time 
intervals 
inter-departure times was introduced to eliminate synchronization of packet 
arrival at the ingress router.  The ingress router used a Token Bucket policing 
method to assign code points to incoming packets. 
4.3.2.  Experiments 
In our first set of experiments, we compared the out-of-profile rate 
produced in the simulation to that calculated using Equation (9).  Runs were 
conducted for several different values of p0.  The values of W, and p0 were held 
constant during each run, and the value of d was manipulated by varying tA 
while holding tC, tF, and t constant.  The results of these trials are shown in 
Figure 4.   
The simulated results correlated well with our predicted results.  For 
cases in which W > d, but the difference was small, the countermeasure was 
effective in limiting the out-of-profile rate for valid packets.  When W >> d, the 
out-of-profile rate for valid packets approached p0. 
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Figure 4.  Predicted Out-of-Profile Rates vs. Measured Results 
 
Our secondary interest was to observe the effect changing the bucket 
size for the Token Bucket policer would have on the DoS countermeasure.  In 
each run, the values of W, d, and p0 were held constant.  The size of the token 
bucket was increased exponentially until it was large enough to prevent any 
packets from being dropped regardless of their true source.  Runs were 
conducted for cases in which W>d and W<d.  The results are plotted in Figure 5.  












Figure 3.  Experimental Network Topology
to minimize out-of-profile marking for valid traffic while maximizing it for 
invalid traffic.  We also note that the marking rate for valid traffic is higher than 
predicted if the token bucket size is not optimized.  We attribute this to the 
longer delay in starting the countermeasure that logically accompanies a larger 
token bucket.  If the ingress router allows larger bursts of traffic, then it will 
take longer for packets to be marked out-of-profile once an attack commences. 
Figure 5.  Effect of Token Bucket Size on Out-of Profile Rate   
 
5.  Discussion 
 
In this section, we point out some potential weaknesses of a naïve 
implementation of the proposed DoS countermeasure algorithm and describe 
how to refine the algorithm to eliminate them.  We also discuss ways of 
extending the algorithm to aid in detection of service theft. 
5.1.  Algorithm Refinements 
So far in the discussions, we have assumed that the attacker behaves in a 
predictable way.  In reality, however, the attacker will be much less predictable.  
One sure thing is that the attacker will try to find holes in the DoS 
countermeasure algorithm itself and attack them directly.  It is important to 
anticipate such attacks and refine the algorithm to fix these holes. 
 One direct attack on the DoS countermeasure as we have implemented 
it can be launched as follows.  The attacker contrives its attack traffic so that 
every possible ToS value is used at a high frequency.  Since there are a total of 
only 256 different ToS values, it is not difficult for the attacker to do so.  As a 
result, it occurs frequently that an attack packet carries a ToS matching the next 
ToS expected by the ingress router. Processing that packet will trigger a 
premature signature change at the ingress. The resulting signature asynchrony 
between the client traffic and the ingress router will cause all future client 
packets to be dropped by the DoS countermeasure.  
The above scenario actually does more damage to the client than the 
target scenario described in Section 2.  To deal with this problem, the DoS 
countermeasure algorithm must be refined to include a reliable method for the 
client traffic and the ingress router to synchronize their signature updates.  For 
this paper, we first examined a solution based on the concept of time-driven key 
sequencing [13].  The client and the ingress router both update their signatures 
periodically and each uses its own local clock to determine the update instances. 
This method has the advantage of low communication overhead because it 
requires no additional message exchange between the client and the ingress 
router.  However, it requires tight synchronization between the clocks of the 
client and the ingress router.  Unfortunately, achieving tight clock 
synchronization in a secure fashion without using specialized hardware (e.g., 
GPS clocks) remains an open problem. 
 When tight clock synchronization between the client and the ingress 
router is not possible, we propose to refine the DoS countermeasure algorithm 
as follows.  The client sends a special signaling packet to request the ingress 
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Each signaling packet is marked with the signature in use prior to the update so 
that it will not be dropped due to the DoS countermeasure.  Like the signatures, 
the sequence of payloads of these signaling packets, e.g., a sequence of 64-bit 
values, may be pre-computed5 at both the client and the ingress router based on 
the seed key and the shared secret.  Therefore, their creation incurs little extra 
latency to the data path of normal client traffic. The ingress router checks the 
validity of a signaling packet based on the packet’s payload.  A valid signaling 
packet should carry the next payload expected by the ingress router.  The large 
number of bits in the payload makes it virtually impossible for the attacker to 
succeed in producing a valid signaling packet with a brute-force approach.  
The signaling packets may be identified in several ways.  For example, 
the client may put an all-zero Identification field in their IP header.  For 
reliability, the client may send multiple signaling packets for each signature 
update.  These packets will not be metered against the client’s committed rate, 
and once the change has been made, any subsequent signaling packets for the 
same update will be automatically discarded, since they are marked with the 
previous signature.  It is not necessary for a signaling packet to deliver the new 
signature since the ingress router has pre-computed all the signatures.  On the 
other hand, if the new signature is always appended to the signaling packet 
payload, then there is no need for the ingress router to pre-compute the 
signatures. 
 Another problem arises when the client becomes idle for a long time. 
Without new client traffic to trigger a change, a signature may remain valid at 
the ingress router for a very long time, opening a door for service theft.  A 
simple solution to this problem is having the ingress router time out a signature 
if it has not received a new signaling packet for a predetermined amount of 
time. 
 It should be noted that these refinements for achieving better signature 
synchronization between the client and the ingress router have very little impact 
on the performance analysis presented in Section 4. 
5.2.  Detection of Service Theft 
A service theft can be defined as a course of actions taken by a perpetrator to 
use a portion of a valid client’s allocated bandwidth and obtain a premium 
service without pay.  Unlike a DoS attack, the intruder is typically much more 
restrained to cover his tracks.  Therefore, a service theft usually does not cause 
as much direct harm to the client as a DoS attack.  For example, the intruder 
                                                 
5 For example, the new signature and related signaling packet payload may be 
extracted from one 128-bit keyed-MD5 hash value. 
may study the client’s traffic pattern and adjust his own traffic volume over 
time so that the ingress router will never mark an excessive number of packets 
out of profile for that client.  This service theft results in lost revenue and 
network availability for the DiffServ provider.  Therefore, the service provider 
will treat them as serious offenses that must be dealt with, in the same way 
cable companies handle illegal cable installations. 
The proposed feedback mechanism and the resulting cooperation 
between the client and the ingress router may help the service provider detect 
service theft.  For example the ingress router may activate the feedback 
mechanism randomly, regardless of whether or not it has just marked a large 
number of packets out of profile for the client.  It is important for the system to 
use a random signature time window (W) so that the intruder is unable to predict 
how much longer a spoofed signature may be valid and adjust its traffic pattern 
accordingly.  If a service theft is under way, the ingress router should notice two 
or more signatures being frequently used at the same time.  When this occurs, 
the ingress router may log the event as a possible occurrence of service theft or 
immediately alert the network operator to perform further investigations. 
If the intruder can monitor feedback messages from the ingress router, 
he can defeat the ingress router’s service theft detection by suspending his 
flooding traffic upon seeing a feedback message.  In other words, the proposed 
theft detection mechanism may not catch service theft launched by a more 
resourceful intruder.  However, it will be sufficient to stop the service theft from 
continuing, and more importantly, it will deter future service theft by forcing the 
intruder to expend more resources and effort to avoid detection.  
A general conclusion can be drawn from the above discussion.  That is, 
the proposed DoS countermeasure may be extended into an auditing function 
that is orthogonal to access control. For example, it may be used in conjunction 
with an IP AH based packet authentication scheme to mitigate DoS attacks and 
detect service theft in cases where the authentication process has been 
compromised. 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
 
We have demonstrated that it is possible to mitigate DoS attacks against 
DiffServ clients and detect service theft without per-packet cryptographic 
processing.  The tradeoff for the efficiency gain is the lack of guarantee on 
100% rejection of malicious packets at the ingress. Our view is that DoS attacks 
and service theft are more of a QoS guarantee problem than one about security 
assurance.  The proposed countermeasure should be combined with other 
security protocols if both QoS guarantee and security assurance are required.  
Its low cost makes it an excellent choice as an independent monitor for possible 
breaches of the security protocols.  
We predict that some form of feedback mechanism is going to be 
installed for DiffServ clients in the future to take advantage of the explicit bond 
(SLA) between the client and provider.  If that happens, it will take very little 
effort to deploy the proposed DoS countermeasure.  
Finally, we would like to point out that the proposed scheme might 
also be used to mitigate DoS attacks against a client that are launched inside the 
DoS domain. In this case, the egress router will have to be the one who sends a 
feedback message to the client and filters out malicious packets based on 
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